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Abstract
In this paper, we study fault-tolerant distributed consensus in wireless systems. In more
detail, we produce two new randomized algorithms that solve this problem in the abstract
MAC layer model, which captures the basic interface and communication guarantees provided
by most wireless MAC layers. Our algorithms work for any number of failures, require no
advance knowledge of the network participants or network size, and guarantee termination
with high probability after a number of broadcasts that are polynomial in the network size.
Our first algorithm satisfies the standard agreement property, while our second trades a faster
termination guarantee in exchange for a looser agreement property in which most nodes agree
on the same value. These are the first known fault-tolerant consensus algorithms for this model.
In addition to our main upper bound results, we explore the gap between the abstract MAC
layer and the standard asynchronous message passing model by proving fault-tolerant consensus
is impossible in the latter in the absence of information regarding the network participants, even
if we assume no faults, allow randomized solutions, and provide the algorithm a constant-factor
approximation of the network size.
1 Introduction
Consensus provides a fundamental building block for developing reliable distributed systems [23–25].
Accordingly, it is well studied in many different system models [36]. Until recently, however, little
was known about solving this problem in distributed systems made up of devices communicating
using commodity wireless cards. Motivated by this knowledge gap, this paper studies consensus in
the abstract MAC layer model, which abstracts the basic behavior and guarantees of standard wire-
less MAC layers. In recent work [43], we proved deterministic fault-tolerant consensus is impossible
in this setting. In this paper, we describe and analyze the first known randomized fault-tolerant
consensus algorithms for this well-motivated model.
The Abstract MAC Layer. Most existing work on distributed algorithms for wireless networks
assumes low-level synchronous models that force algorithms to directly grapple with issues caused
by contention and signal fading. Some of these models describe the network topology with a graph
(c.f., [8,16,20,28,32,39]), while others use signal strength calculations to determine message behavior
(c.f., [17,21,26,27,38,40]).
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As also emphasized in [43], these models are useful for asking foundational questions about dis-
tributed computation on shared channels, but are not so useful for developing algorithmic strategies
suitable for deployment. In real systems, algorithms typically do not operate in synchronous rounds
and they are not provided unmediated access to the radio. They must instead operate on top of a
general-purpose MAC layer which is responsible for many network functions, including contention
management, rate control, and co-existence with other network traffic.
Motivated by this reality, in this paper we adopt the abstract MAC layer model [34], an asyn-
chronous broadcast-based communication model that captures the basic interfaces and guarantees
provided by common existing wireless MAC layers. In more detail, if you provide the abstract
MAC layer a message to broadcast, it will eventually be delivered to nearby nodes in the network.
The specific means by which contention is managed—e.g., CSMA, TDMA, uniform probabilistic
routines such as DECAY [8]—is abstracted away by the model. At some point after the contention
management completes, the abstract MAC layer passes back an acknowledgment indicating that it
is ready for the next message. This acknowledgment contains no information about the number or
identities of the message recipient.
(In the case of the MAC layer using CSMA, for example, the acknowledgment would be gener-
ated after the MAC layer detects a clear channel. In the case of TDMA, the acknowledgment would
be generated after the device’s turn in the TDMA schedule. In the case of a probabilistic routine
such as DECAY, the acknowledgment would be generated after a sufficient number of attempts to
guarantee successful delivery to all receivers with high probability.)
The abstract MAC abstraction, of course, does not attempt to provide a detailed representation
of any specific existing MAC layer. Real MAC layers offer many more modes and features then
is captured by this model. In addition, the variation studied in this paper assumes messages are
always delivered, whereas more realistic variations would allow for occasional losses.
This abstraction, however, still serves to capture the fundamental dynamics of real wireless
application design in which the lower layers dealing directly with the radio channel are separated
from the higher layers executing the application in question. An important goal in studying this
abstract MAC layer, therefore, is attempting to uncover principles and strategies that can close the
gap between theory and practice in the design of distributed systems deployed on standard layered
wireless architectures.
Our Results. In this paper, we studied randomized fault-tolerant consensus algorithms in the
abstract MAC layer model. In more detail, we study binary consensus and assume a single-hop
network topology. Notice, our use of randomization is necessary, as deterministic consensus is impos-
sible in the abstract MAC layer model in the presence of even a single fault (see our generalization
of FLP from [43]).
To contextualize our results, we note that the abstract MAC layer model differs from standard
asynchronous message passing models in two main ways: (1) the abstract MAC layer model provides
the algorithm no advance information about the network size or membership, requiring nodes to
communicate with a blind broadcast primitive instead of using point-to-point channels, (2) the
abstract MAC layer model provides an acknowledgment to the broadcaster at some point after its
message has been delivered to all of its neighbors. This acknowledgment, however, contains no
information about the number or identity of these neighbors (see above for more discussion of this
fundamental feature of standard wireless MAC layers).
Most randomized fault-tolerant consensus algorithms in the asynchronous message passing
model strongly leverage knowledge of the network. A strategy common to many of these algo-
2
rithms, for example, is to repeatedly collect messages from at least n− f nodes in a network of size
n with at most f crash failures (e.g., [9]). This strategy does not work in the abstract MAC layer
model as nodes do not know n.
To overcome this issue, we adapt an idea introduced in early work on fault-tolerant consensus in
the asynchronous shared memory model: counter racing (e.g., [5,12]). At a high-level, this strategy
has nodes with initial value 0 advance a shared memory counter associated with 0, while nodes
with initial value 1 advance a counter associated with 1. If a node sees one counter get ahead of
the other, they adopt the initial value associated with the larger counter, and if a counter gets
sufficiently far ahead, then nodes can decide.
Our first algorithm (presented in Section 3) implements a counter race of sorts using the ac-
knowledged blind broadcast primitive provided by the model. Roughly speaking, nodes continually
broadcast their current proposal and counter, and update both based on the pairs received from
other nodes. Proving safety for this type of strategy in shared memory models is simplified by
the atomic nature of register accesses. In the abstract MAC layer model, by contrast, a broadcast
message is delivered non-atomically to its recipients, and in the case of a crash, may not arrive at
some recipients at all.1 Our safety analysis, therefore, requires novel analytical tools that tame a
more diverse set of possible system configurations.
To achieve liveness, we use a technique loosely inspired by the randomized delay strategy intro-
duced by Chandra in the shared memory model [12] . In more detail, nodes probabilistically decide
to replace certain sequences of their counter updates with nop placeholders. We show that if these
probabilities are adapted appropriately, the system eventually arrives at a state where it becomes
likely for only a single node to be broadcasting updates, allowing progress toward termination.
Formally, we prove that with high probability in the network size n, the algorithm terminates
after O(n3 log n) broadcasts are scheduled. This holds regardless of which broadcasts are scheduled
(i.e., we do not impose a fairness condition), and regardless of the number of faults. The algorithm,
as described, assumes nodes are provided unique IDs that we treat as comparable black boxes
(to prevent them from leaking network size information). We subsequently show how to remove
that assumption by describing an algorithm that generates unique IDs in this setting with high
probability.
Our second algorithm (presented in Section 4) trades a looser agreement guarantee for more effi-
ciency. In more detail, we describe and analyze a solution to almost-everywhere agreement [18], that
guarantees most nodes agree on the same value. This algorithm terminates after O(n2 log4 n log log n)
broadcasts, which is a linear factor faster than our first algorithm (ignoring log factors). The almost-
everywhere consensus algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase is used to ensure that almost
all nodes obtain a good approximation of the network size. In the second phase, nodes use this
estimate to perform a sequence of broadcasts meant to help spread their proposal to the network.
Nodes that did not obtain a good estimate in Phase 1 will leave Phase 2 early. The remaining
nodes, however, can leverage their accurate network size estimates to probabilistically sample a
subset to actively participate in each round of broadcasts. To break ties between simultaneously
active nodes, each chooses a random rank using the estimate obtained in Phase 1. We show that
with high probability, after not too long, there exists a round of broadcasts in which the first
node receiving its acknowledgment is both active and has the minimum rank among other active
1We note that register simulations are also not an option in our model for two reasons: standard simulation
algorithms require knowledge of n and a majority correct nodes, whereas we assume no knowledge of n and wait-
freedom.
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nodes—allowing its proposal to spread to all remaining nodes.
Finally, we explore the gap between the abstract MAC layer model and the related asynchronous
message passage passing model. We prove (in Section 5) that fault-tolerant consensus is impossible
in the asynchronous message passing model in the absence of knowledge of network participants,
even if we assume no faults, allow randomized algorithms, and provide a constant-factor approxi-
mation of n. This differs from the abstract MAC layer model where we solve this problem without
network participant or network size information, and assuming crash failures. This result implies
that the fact that broadcasts are acknowledged in the abstract MAC layer model is crucial to
overcoming the difficulties induced by limited network information.
Related Work. Consensus provides a fundamental building block for reliable distributed comput-
ing [23–25]. It is particularly well-studied in asynchronous models [2, 35,42,46].
The abstract MAC layer approach2 to modeling wireless networks was introduced in [33] (later
expanded to a journal version [34]), and has been subsequently used to study several different
problems [14,15,29,30,43]. The most relevant of this related work is [43], which was the first paper
to study consensus in the abstract MAC layer model. This previous paper generalized the seminal
FLP [19] result to prove deterministic consensus is impossible in this model even in the presence of a
single failure. It then goes on to study deterministic consensus in the absence of failures, identifying
the pursuit of fault-tolerant randomized solutions as important future work—the challenge taken
up here.
We note that other researchers have also studied consensus using high-level wireless network
abstractions. Vollset and Ezhilchelvan [47], and Alekeish and Ezhilchelvan [4], study consensus
in a variant of the asynchronous message passing model where pairwise channels come and go
dynamically—capturing some behavior of mobile wireless networks. Their correctness results de-
pend on detailed liveness guarantees that bound the allowable channel changes. Wu et al. [48]
use the standard asynchronous message passing model (with unreliable failure detectors [13]) as
a stand-in for a wireless network, focusing on how to reduce message complexity (an important
metric in a resource-bounded wireless setting) in solving consensus.
A key difficulty for solving consensus in the abstract MAC layer model is the absence of advance
information about network participants or size. These constraints have also been studied in other
models. Ruppert [45], and Bonnet and Raynal [10], for example, study the amount of extra power
needed (in terms of shared objects and failure detection, respectively) to solve wait-free consensus
in anonymous versions of the standard models. Attiya et al. [6] describe consensus solutions for
shared memory systems without failures or unique ids. A series of papers [3, 11, 22], starting with
the work of Cavin et al. [11], study the related problem of consensus with unknown participants
(CUPs), where nodes are only allowed to communicate with other nodes whose identities have been
provided by a participant detector formalism.
Closer to our own model is the work of Abboud et al. [1], which also studies a single hop net-
work where nodes broadcast messages to an unknown group of network participants. They prove
deterministic consensus is impossible in these networks under these assumptions without knowl-
edge of network size. In this paper, we extend these existing results by proving this impossibility
still holds even if we assume randomized algorithms and provided the algorithm a constant-factor
approximation of the network size. This bound opens a sizable gap with our abstract MAC layer
2There is no one abstract MAC layer model. Different studies use different variations. They all share, however,
the same general commitment to capturing the types of interfaces and communication/timing guarantees that are
provided by standard wireless MAC layers
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model in which consensus is solvable without this network information.
We also consider almost-everywhere (a.e.) agreement [18], a weaker variant of consensus, where
a small number of nodes are allowed to decide on conflicting values, as long as a sufficiently large
majority agrees. Recently, a.e. agreement has been studied in the context of peer-to-peer networks
(c.f. [7,31]), where the adversary can isolate small parts of the network thus rendering (everywhere)
consensus impossible. We are not aware of any prior work on a.e. agreement in the wireless settings.
2 Model and Problem
In this paper, we study a variation of the abstract MAC layer model, which describes system
consisting of a single hop network of n ≥ 1 computational devices (called nodes in the following)
that communicate wirelessly using communication interfaces and guarantees inspired by commodity
wireless MAC layers.
In this model, nodes communicate with a bcast primitive that guarantees to eventually deliver
the broadcast message to all the other nodes (i.e., the network is single hop). At some point after
a given bcast has succeeded in delivering a message to all other nodes, the broadcaster receives an
ack informing it that the broadcast is complete (as detailed in the introduction, this captures the
reality that most wireless contention management schemes have a definitive point at which they
know a message broadcast is complete). This acknowledgment contains no information about the
number or identity of the receivers.
We assume a node can only broadcast one message at a time. That is, once it invokes bcast,
it cannot broadcast another message until receiving the corresponding ack (formally, overlapping
messages are discarded by the MAC layer). We also assume any number of nodes can permanently
stop executing due to crash failures. As in the classical message passing models, a crash can occur
during a broadcast, meaning that some nodes might receive the message while others do not.
This model is event-driven with the relevant events scheduled asynchronously by an arbitrary
scheduler. In more detail, for each node u, there are four event types relevant to u that can
be scheduled: initu (which occurs at the beginning of an execution and allows u to initialize),
recv(m)u (which indicates that u has received message m broadcast from another node), ack(m)u
(which indicates that the message m broadcast by u has been successfully delivered), and crashu
(which indicates that u is crashed for the remainder of the execution).
A distributed algorithm specifies for each node u a finite collection of steps to execute for each
of the non-crash event types. When one of these events is scheduled by the scheduler, we assume
the corresponding steps are executed atomically at the point that the event is scheduled. Notice
that one of the steps that a node u can take in response to these events is to invoke a bcast(m)u
primitive for some message m. When an event includes a bcast primitive we say it is combined with
a broadcast.3
We place the following constraints on the scheduler. It must start each execution by scheduling
an init event for each node; i.e., we study the setting where all participating nodes are activated
at the beginning of the execution. If a node u invokes a valid bcast(m)u primitive, then for each
v 6= u that is not crashed when the broadcast primitive is invoked, the scheduler must subsequently
3Notice, we can assume without loss of generality, that the steps executed in response to an event never invoke more
than a single bcast primitive, as any additional broadcasts invoked at the same time would lead to the messages being
discarded due to the model constraint that a node must receive an ack for the current message before broadcasting
a new message.
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either schedule a single recv(m)v or crashv event at v. At some point after these events are
scheduled, it must then eventually schedule an ack(m)u event at u. These are the only recv and
ack events it schedules (i.e., it cannot create new messages from scratch or cause messages to
be received/acknowledged multiple times). If the scheduler schedules a crashv event, it cannot
subsequently schedule any future events for u.
We assume that in making each event scheduling decision, the scheduler can use the schedule
history as well as the algorithm definition, but it does not know the nodes’ private states (which
includes the nodes’ random bits). When the scheduler schedules an event that triggers a broadcast
(making it a combined event), it is provided this information so that it knows it must now schedule
receive events for the message. We assume, however, that the scheduler does not learn the contents
of the broadcast message.4
Given an execution α, we say the message schedule for α, also indicated msg[α], is the sequence
of message events (i.e., recv, ack, and crash) scheduled in the execution. We assume that a message
schedule includes indications of which events are combined with broadcasts.
The Consensus Problem. In this paper, we study binary consensus with probabilistic termina-
tion. In more detail, at the beginning of an execution each node is provided an initial value from
{0, 1} as input. Each node has the ability to perform a single irrevocable decide action for either
value 0 or 1. To solve consensus, an algorithm must guarantee the following three properties: (1)
agreement: no two nodes decide different values; (2) validity: if a node decides value b, then at least
one node started with initial value b; and (3) termination (probabilistic): every non-crashed node
decides with probability 1 in the limit.
Studying finite termination bounds is complicated in asynchronous models because the scheduler
can delay specific nodes taking steps for arbitrarily long times. In this paper, we circumvent this
issue by proving bounds on the number of scheduled events before the system reaches a termination
state in which every non-crashed node has: (a) decided; or (b) will decide whenever the scheduler
gets around to scheduling its next ack event.
Finally, in addition to studying consensus with standard agreement, we also study almost-
everywhere agreement, in which only a specified majority fraction (typically a 1 − o(n) fraction of
the n total nodes) must agree.
3 Consensus Algorithm
Here we describe analyze our randomized binary consensus algorithm: counter race consensus (see
Algorithms 1 and 2 for pseudocode, and Section 3.1 for a high-level description of its behavior).
This algorithm assumes no advance knowledge of the network participants or network size. Nodes
are provided unique IDs, but these are treated as comparable black boxes, preventing them from
leaking information about the network size. (We will later discuss how to remove the unique ID
assumption.) It tolerates any number of crash faults.
4This adversary model is sometimes called message oblivious and it is commonly considered a good fit for schedulers
that control network behavior. This follows because it allows the scheduler to adapt the schedule based on the number
of messages being sent and their sources—enabling it to model contention and load factors. One the other hand, there
is not good justification for the idea that this schedule should somehow also depend on the specific bits contained in
the messages sent. Notice, our liveness proof specifically leverages the message oblivious assumption as it prevents
the scheduler from knowing which nodes are sending updates and which are sending nop messages.
6
Algorithm 1 Counter Race Consensus (for node u with UID idu and initial value vu)
Initialization:
cu ← 0
nu ← 2
Cu ← {(idu, cu, vu)}
peers← {idu}
phase← 0
active← true
decide← −1
k ← 3
c← k + 3
bcast(nop, idu, nu)
On Receiving ack(m):
phase← phase+ 1
if m = (decide, b) then
decide(b) and halt()
else
newm← ⊥
C ′u ← Cu
cˆ
(0)
u ← max counter in C ′u paired with value 0 (default to 0 if no such elements)
cˆ
(1)
u ← max counter in C ′u paired with value 1 (default to 0 if no such elements)
if cˆ
(0)
u > cˆ
(1)
u then vu ← 0
else if cˆ
(1)
u > cˆ
(0)
u then vu ← 1
if cˆ
(0)
u ≥ cˆ(1)u + k or decide = 0 then newm← (decide, 0)
else if cˆ
(1)
u ≥ cˆ(0)u + k or decide = 1 then newm← (decide, 1)
if newm = ⊥ then
if max{cˆ(0)u , cˆ(1)u } ≤ cu and m 6= nop then cu ← cu + 1
else if max{cˆ(0)u , cˆ(1)u } > cu then cu ← max{cˆ(0)u , cˆ(1)u }
update (idu, ∗, ∗) element in Cu with new cu and vu
newm← (counter, idu, cu, vu, nu)
if phase % c = 1 then with probability 1/nu active← true otherwise active← false
if newm = (decide, ∗) or active = true then
bcast(newm)
else
bcast(nop, idu, nu)
On Receiving Message m:
updateEstimate(m)
if m = (decide, b) then
decide← b
else if m = (counter, id, c, v, n′) then
if ∃c′, v′ such that (id, c′, v′) ∈ Cu then
remove (id, c′, v′) from Cu
add (id, c, v) to Cu 7
Algorithm 2 The updateEstimate(m) subroutine called by Counter Race Consensus during
recv(m) event.
if m contains a UID id and network size estimate n′ then
peers← peers ∪ {id}
nu ← max{nu, |peers|, n′}
3.1 Algorithm Description
The counter race consensus algorithm is described in pseudocode in the figures labeled Algorithm
1 and 2. Here we summarize the behavior formalized by this pseudocode.
The core idea of this algorithm is that each node u maintains a counter cu (initialized to 0) and
a proposal vu (initialized to its consensus initial value). Node u repeatedly broadcasts cu and vu,
updating these values before each broadcast. That is, during the ack event for its last broadcast of
cu and vu, node u will apply a set of update rules to these values. It then concludes the ack event
by broadcasting these updated values. This pattern repeats until u arrives at a state where it can
safely commit to deciding a value.
The update rules and decision criteria applied during the ack event are straightforward. Each
node u first calculates cˆ
(0)
u , the largest counter value it has sent or received in a message containing
proposal value 0, and cˆ
(1)
u , the largest counter value it has sent or received in a message containing
proposal value 1.
If cˆ
(0)
u > cˆ
(1)
u , then u sets vu ← 0, and if cˆ(1)u > cˆ(0)u , then u sets vu ← 1. That is, u adopts
the proposal that is currently “winning” the counter race (in case of a tie, it does not change its
proposal).
Node u then checks to see if either value is winning by a large enough margin to support a
decision. In more detail, if cˆ
(0)
u ≥ cˆ(1)u +3, then u commits to deciding 0, and if cˆ(1)u ≥ cˆ(0)u +3, then
u commits to deciding 1.
What happens next depends on whether or not u committed to a decision. If u did not commit
to a decision (captured in the if newm = ⊥ then conditional), then it must update its counter
value. To do so, it compares its current counter cu to cˆ
(0)
u and cˆ
(1)
u . If cu is smaller than one of
these counters, it sets cu ← max{cˆ(0)u , cˆ(1)u }. Otherwise, if cu is the largest counter that u has sent
or received so far, it will set cu ← cu + 1. Either way, its counter increases. At this point, u can
complete the ack event by broadcasting a message containing its newly updated cu and vu values.
On the other hand, if u committed to deciding value b, then it will send a (decide, b) message
to inform the other nodes of its decision. On subsequently receiving an ack for this message, u
will decide b and halt. Similarly, if u ever receives a (decide, b) message from another node, it will
commit to deciding b. During its next ack event, it will send its own (decide, b) message and decide
and halt on its corresponding ack. That is, node u will not decide a value until it has broadcast its
commitment to do so, and received an ack on the broadcast.
The behavior described above guarantees agreement and validity. It is not sufficient, however,
to achieve liveness, as an ill-tempered scheduler can conspire to keep the race between 0 and 1 too
close for a decision commitment. To overcome this issue we introduce a random delay strategy that
has nodes randomly step away from the race for a while by replacing their broadcast values with
nop placeholders ignored by those who receive them. Because our adversary does not learn the
content of broadcast messages, it does not know which nodes are actively participating and which
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nodes are taking a break (as in both cases, nodes continually broadcast messages)—thwarting its
ability to effectively manipulate the race.
In more detail, each node u partitions its broadcasts into groups of size 6. At the beginning
of each such group, u flips a weighted coin to determine whether or not to replace the counter
and proposal values it broadcasts during this group with nop placeholders—eliminating its ability
to affect other nodes’ counter/proposal values. As we will later elaborate in the liveness analysis,
the goal is to identify a point in the execution in which a single node v is broadcasting its values
while all other nodes are broadcasting nop values—allowing v to advance its proposal sufficiently
far ahead to win the race.
To be more specific about the probabilities used in this logic, node u maintains an estimate nu
of the number of nodes in the network. It replaces values with nop placeholders in a given group
with probability 1/nu. (In the pseudocode, the active flag indicates whether or not u is using nop
placeholders in the current group.) Node u initializes nu to 2. It then updates it by calling the
updateEstimate routine (described in Algorithm 2) for each message it receives.
There are two ways for this routine to update nu. The first is if the number of unique IDs that
u has received so far (stored in peers) is larger than nu. In this case, it sets nu ← |peers|. The
second way is if it learns another node has an estimate n′ > nu. In this case, it sets nu ← n′.
Node u learns about other nodes’ estimates, as the algorithm has each node append its current
estimate to all of its messages (with the exception of decide messages). In essence, the nodes are
running a network size estimation routine parallel to its main counter race logic—as nodes refine
their estimates, their probability of taking useful breaks improves.
3.2 Safety
We begin our analysis by proving that our algorithm satisfies the agreement and validity properties
of the consensus problem. Validity follows directly from the algorithm description. Our strategy
to prove agreement is to show that if any node sees a value b with a counter at least 3 ahead of
value 1 − b (causing it to commit to deciding b), then b is the only possible decision value. Race
arguments of this type are easier to prove in a shared memory setting where nodes work with
objects like atomic registers that guarantee linearization points. In our message passing setting, by
contrast, in which broadcast messages arrive at different receivers at different times, we will require
more involved definitions and operational arguments.5
We start with a useful definition. We say b dominates 1 − b at a given point in the execution,
if every (non-crashed) node at this point believes b is winning the race, and none of the messages
in transit can change this perception.
To formalize this notion we need some notation. In the following, we say at point t (or at t),
with respect to an event t from the message schedule of an execution α, to describe the state of the
system immediately after event t (and any associated steps that execute atomically with t) occurs.
We also use the notation in transit at t to describe messages that have been broadcast but not yet
received at every non-crashed receiver at t.
Definition 3.1. Fix an execution α, event t in the corresponding message schedule msg[α], con-
sensus value b ∈ {0, 1}, and counter value c ≥ 0. We say α is (b, c)-dominated at t if the following
5We had initially hoped there might be some way to simulate linearizable shared objects in our model. Unfortu-
nately, our nodes’ lack of information about the network size thwarted standard simulation strategies which typically
require nodes to collect messages from a majority of nodes in the network before proceeding to the next step of the
simulation.
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conditions are true:
1. For every node u that is not crashed at t: cˆ
(b)
u [t] > c and cˆ
(1−b)
u [t] ≤ c, where at point t, cˆ(b)u [t]
(resp. cˆ
(1−b)
u [t]) is the largest value u has sent or received in a counter message containing
consensus value b (resp. 1−b). If u has not sent or received any counter messages containing b
(resp. 1−b), then by default it sets cˆ(b)u [t]← 0 (resp. cˆ(1−b)u [t]← 0) in making this comparison.
2. For every message of the form (counter, id, 1 − b, c′, n′) that is in transit at t: c′ ≤ c.
The following lemma formalizes the intuition that once an execution becomes dominated by a
given value, it remains dominated by this value.
Lemma 3.2. Assume some execution α is (b, c)-dominated at point t. It follows that α is (b, c)-
dominated at every t′ that comes after t.
Proof. In this proof, we focus on the suffix of the message schedule msg[α] that begins with event
t. For simplicity, we label these events E1, E2, E3, ..., with E1 = t. We will prove the lemma by
induction on this sequence.
The base case (E1) follows directly from the lemma statement. For the inductive step, we
must show that if α is (b, c)-dominated at point Ei, then it will be dominated at Ei+1 as well. By
the inductive hypothesis, we assume the execution is dominated immediately before Ei+1 occurs.
Therefore, the only way the step is violated is if Ei+1 transitions the system from dominated to
non-dominated status. We consider all possible cases for Ei+1 and show none of them can cause
such a transition.
The first case is if Ei+1 is a crashu event for some node u. It is clear that a crash cannot
transition a system into non-dominated status.
The second case is if Ei+1 is a recv(m)u event for some node u. This event can only transition
the system into a non-dominated status if m is a counter message that includes 1− b and a counter
c′ > c. For u to receive this message, however, means that the message was in transit immediately
before Ei+1 occurs. Because we assume the system is dominated at Ei, however, no such message
can be in transit at this point (by condition 2 of the domination definition).
The third and final case is if Ei+1 is a ack(m)u event for some node u, that is combined with a
bcast(m′)u event, where m
′ is a counter message that includes 1− b and a counter c′ > c. Consider
the values cˆ
(b)
u and cˆ
(1−b)
u set by node u early in the steps associated with this ack(m)u event. By
our inductive hypothesis, which tells us that the execution is dominated right before this ack(m)u
event occurs, it must follow that cˆ
(b)
u > cˆ
(1−b)
u (as cˆ
(b)
u = cˆ
(b)
u [Ei] and cˆ
(1−b)
u = cˆ
(1−b)
u [Ei]). In the
steps that immediately follow, therefore, node u will set vu ← b. It is therefore impossible for u to
then broadcast a counter message with value vu = 1− b.
To prove agreement, we are left to show that if a node commits to deciding some value b, then it
must be the case that b dominates the execution at this point—making it the only possible decision
going forward. The following helper lemma, which captures a useful property about counters, will
prove crucial for establishing this point.
Lemma 3.3. Assume event t in the message schedule of execution α is combined with a bcast(m)v,
where m = (counter, idv , c, b, nv), for some counter c > 0. It follows that prior to t in α, every
node that is non-crashed at t received a counter message with counter c− 1 and value b.
Proof. Fix some t, α, v and m = (counter, idv , c, b, nv), as specified by the lemma statement. Let t
′
be the first event in α such that at t′ some node w has local counter cw ≥ c and value vw = b. We
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know at least one such event exists as t and v satisfy the above conditions, so the earliest such event,
t′, is well-defined. Furthermore, because t′ must modify local counter and/or consensus values, it
must also be an ack event.
For the purposes of this argument, let cw and vw be w’s counter and consensus value, respectively,
immediately before t′ is scheduled. Similarly, let c′w and v
′
w be these values immediately after t
′
and its steps complete (i.e., these values at point t′). By assumption: c′w ≥ c and v′w = b. We
proceed by studying the possibilities for cw and vw and their relationships with c
′
w and v
′
w.
We begin by considering vw. We want to argue that vw = b. To see why this is true, assume for
contradiction that vw = 1− b. It follows that early in the steps for t′, node w switches its consensus
value from 1− b to b. By the definition of the algorithm, it only does this if at this point in the ack
steps: cˆ
(b)
w > cˆ
(1−b)
w ≥ cw (the last term follows because cw is included in the values considered when
defining c
(1−b)
w ). Note, however, that c
(b)
w must be less than c. If it was greater than or equal to c,
this would imply that a node ended an earlier event with counter ≥ c and value b—contradicting
our assumption that t′ was the earliest such event. If c
(b)
w < c and c
(b)
w > cw, then w must increase
its cw value during this event. But because cˆ
(b)
w > cˆ
(1−b)
w ≥ cw, the only allowable change to cw
would be to set it to cˆ
(b)
w < c. This contradicts the assumption that c′w ≥ c.
At this checkpoint in our argument we have argued that vw = b. We now consider cw. If cw ≥ c,
then w starts t′ with a sufficiently big counter—contradicting the assumption that t′ is the earliest
such event. It follows that cw < c and w must increase this value during this event.
There are two ways to increase a counter; i.e., the two conditions in the if/else-if statement that
follows the newm = ⊥ check. We start with the second condition. If max{cˆ(b)w , cˆ(1−b)w } > cw, then
w can set cw to this maximum. If this maximum is equal to cˆ
(b)
w , then this would imply cˆ
(b)
w ≥ c.
As argued above, however, it would then follow that a node had a counter ≥ c and value b before
t′. If this is not true, then cˆ
(1−b)
w > c
(b)
w . If this was the case, however, w would have adopted value
1− b earlier in the event, contradicting the assumption that v′w = b.
At this next checkpoint in our argument we have argued that vw = b, cw < c, and w increases
cw to c through the first condition of the if/else if; i.e., it must find that max{cˆ(b)w , cˆ(1−b)w } ≤ cw
and m 6= nop. Because this condition only increases the counter by 1, we can further refine our
assumption to cw = c− 1.
To conclude our argument, consider the implications of them 6= nop component of this condition.
It follows that t′ is an ack(m)w for an actual message m. It cannot be the case that m is a
decide message, as w will not increase its counter on acknowledging a decide. Therefore, m is
a counter message. Furthermore, because counter and consensus values are not modified after
broadcasting a counter message but before receiving its subsequent acknowledgment, we know
m = (counter, idw , cw, vw, ∗) = (counter, idw , c− 1, b, ∗) (we replace the network size estimate with
a wildcard here as these estimates could change during this period).
Because w has an acknowledgment for this m, by the definition of the model, prior to t′: every
non-crashed node received a counter message with counter c − 1 and consensus value b. This is
exactly the claim we are trying to prove.
Our main safety theorem leverages the above two lemmas to establish that committing to decide
b means that b dominates the execution. The key idea is that counter values cannot become too
stale. By Lemma 3.3, if some node has a counter c associated with proposal value 1 − b, then
all nodes have seen a counter of size at least c − 1 associated with 1 − b. It follows that if some
node thinks b is far ahead, then all nodes must think b is far ahead in the race (i.e., b dominates).
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Lemma 3.2 then establishes that this dominance is permanent—making b the only possible decision
value going forward.
Theorem 3.4. The Counter Race Consensus algorithm satisfies validity and agreement.
Proof. Validity follows directly from the definition of the algorithm. To establish agreement, fix
some execution α that includes at least one decision. Let t be the first ack event in α that is
combined with a broadcast of a decide message. We call such a step a pre-decision step as it
prepares nodes to decide in a later step. Let u be the node at which this ack occurs and b be the
value it includes in the decide message. Because we assume at least one process decides in α, we
know t exists. We also know it occurs before any decision.
During the steps associated with t, u sets newm ← (decide, b). This indicates the following
is true: cˆ
(b)
u ≥ cˆ(1−b)u + 3. Based on this condition, we establish two claims about the system at t,
expressed with respect to the value cˆ
(1−b)
u during these steps:
• Claim 1. The largest counter included with value 1−b in a counter message broadcast6 before
t is no more than cˆ
(1−b)
u + 1.
Assume for contradiction that before t some v broadcast a counter message with value 1− b
and counter c > cˆ
(1−b)
u + 1. By Lemma 3.3, it follows that before t every non-crashed node
receives a counter message with value 1− b and counter c− 1 ≥ cˆ(1−b)u + 1. This set of nodes
includes u. This contradicts our assumption that at t the largest counter u has seen associated
with 1− b is cˆ(1−b)u .
• Claim 2. Before t, every non-crashed node has sent or received a counter message with value
b and counter at least cˆ
(1−b)
u + 2.
By assumption on the values u has seen at t, we know that before t some node v broadcast
a counter message with value b and counter c ≥ cˆ(1−b)u + 3. By Lemma 3.3, it follows that
before t, every node has sent or received a counter with value b and counter c−1 ≥ cˆ(1−b)u +2.
Notice that claim 1 combined with claim 2 implies that the execution is (b, cˆ
(1−b)
u +1)-dominated
before t. By Lemma 3.2, the execution will remain dominated from this point forward. We assume
t was the first pre-decision, and it will lead u to tell other nodes to decide u before doing so itself.
Other pre-decision steps might occur, however, before all nodes have received u’s preference for b.
With this in mind, let t′ be any other pre-decision step. Because t′ comes after t it will occur in a
(b, cˆ
(1−b)
u + 1)-dominated system. This means that during the first steps of t′, the node will adopt
b as its value (if it has not already done so), meaning it will also promote b.
To conclude, we have shown that once any node reaches a pre-decision step for a value b, then
the system is already dominated in favor of b, and therefore b is the only possible decision value
going forward. Agreement follows directly.
3.3 Liveness
We now turn our attention liveness. Our goal is to prove the following theorem:
6Notice, in these claims, when we say a message is “broadcast” we only mean that the corresponding bcast event
occurred. We make no assumption on which nodes have so far received this message.
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Theorem 3.5. With high probability, within O(n3 ln n) scheduled ack events, every node executing
counter race consensus has either crashed, decided, or received a decide message. In the limit, this
termination condition occurs with probability 1.
Notice that this theorem does not require a fair schedule. It guarantees its termination criteria
(with high probability) after any O(n3 ln n) scheduled ack events, regardless of which nodes these
events occur at. Once the system arrives at a state in which every node has either crashed, decided,
or received a decide message, the execution is now univalent (only one decision value is possible
going forward), and each non-crashed node u will decide after at most two additional ack events
at u.7
Our liveness proof is longer and more involved than our safety proof. This follows, in part,
from the need to introduce multiple technical definitions to help identify the execution fragments
sufficiently well-behaved for us to apply our probabilistic arguments. With this in mind, we divide
the presentation of our liveness proof into two parts. The first part introduces the main ideas of
the analysis and provides a road map of sorts to its component pieces. The second part, which
contains the details, can be found in the full paper [44].
3.3.1 Main Ideas
Here we discuss the main ideas of our liveness proof. A core definition used in our analysis is the
notion of an x-run. Roughly speaking, for a given constant integer x ≥ 2 and node u, we say an
execution fragment β is an x-run for some node u, if it starts and ends with an ack event for u, it
contains x total ack events for u, and no other node has more than x ack events interleaved. We
deploy a recursive counting argument to establish that an execution fragment β that contains at
least n · x total ack events, must contain a sub-fragment β′ that is an x-run for some node u.
To put this result to use, we focus our attention on (2c + 1)-runs, where c = 6 is the constant
used in the algorithm definition to define the length of a group (see Section 3.1 for a reminder of
what a group is and how it is used by the algorithm). A straightforward argument establishes that
a (2c + 1)-run for some node u must contain at least one complete group for u—that is, it must
contain all c broadcasts of one of u’s groups.
Combining these observations, it follows that if we partition an execution into segments of length
n ·(2c+1), each such segment i contains a (2c+1)-run for some node ui, and each such run contains
a complete group for ui. We call this complete group the target group ti for segment i (if there are
multiple complete groups in the run, choose one arbitrarily to be the target).
These target groups are the core unit to which our subsequent analysis applies. Our goal is
to arrive at a target group ti that is clean in the sense that ui is active during the group (i.e.,
sends its actual values instead of nop placeholders), and all broadcasts that arrive at u during this
group come from non-active nodes (i.e., these received messages contain nop placeholders instead of
values). If we achieve a clean group, then it is not hard to show that ui will advance its counter at
least k ahead of all other counters, pushing all other nodes into the termination criteria guaranteed
by Theorem 3.5.
To prove clean groups are sufficiently likely, our analysis must overcome two issues. The first
issue concerns network size estimations. Fix some target group ti. Let Pi be the nodes from which
7In the case where u receives a decide message, the first ack might correspond to the message it was broadcasting
when the decide arrived, and the second ack corresponds to the decide message that u itself will then broadcast.
During this second ack, u will decide and halt.
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ui receives at least one message during ti. If all of these nodes have a network size estimate of at
least ni = |Pi| at the start of ti, we say the group is calibrated. We prove that if ti is calibrated,
then it is clean with a probability in Ω(1/n).
The key, therefore, is proving most target groups are calibrated. To do so, we note that if
some ti is not calibrated, it means at least one node used an estimate strictly less than ni when
it probabilistically defined active at the beginning of this group. During this group, however, all
nodes will receive broadcasts from at least ni unique nodes, increasing all network estimates to
size at least ni.
8 Therefore, each target group that fails to be calibrated increases the minimum
network size estimate in the system by at least 1. It follows that at most n target groups can be
non-calibrated.
The second issue concerns probabilistic dependencies. Let Ei be the event that target group ti
is clean and Ej be the event that some other target group tj is clean. Notice that Ei and Ej are not
necessarily independent. If a node u has a group that overlaps both ti and tj, then its probabilistic
decision about whether or not to be active in this group impacts the potential cleanliness of both
ti and tj.
Our analysis tackles these dependencies by identifying a subset of target groups that are pairwise
independent. To do so, roughly speaking, we process our target groups in order. Starting with the
first target group, we mark as unavailable any future target group that overlaps this first group (in
the sense described above). We then proceed until we arrive at the next target group not marked
unavailable and repeat the process. Each available target group marks at most O(n) future groups
as unavailable. Therefore, given a sufficiently large set T of target groups, we can identify a subset
T ′, with a size in Ω(|T |/n), such that all groups in T ′ are pairwise independent.
We can now pull together these pieces to arrive at our main liveness complexity claim. Consider
the first O(n3 lnn) ack events in an execution. We can divide these into O(n2 lnn) segments of
length (2c + 1)n ∈ Θ(n). We now consider the target groups defined by these segments. By our
above argument, there is a subset T ′ of these groups, where |T ′| ∈ Ω(n lnn), and all target groups
in T ′ are mutually independent. At most n of these remaining target groups are not calibrated. If
we discard these, we are left with a slightly smaller set, of size still Ω(n ln n), that contains only
calibrated and pairwise independent target groups.
We argued that each calibrated group has a probability in Ω(1/n) of being clean. Leveraging
the independence between our identified groups, a standard concentration analysis establishes with
high probability in n that at least one of these Ω(n/ lnn) groups is clean—satisfying the Theorem
statement.
3.3.2 Full Analysis
Our proof of Theorem 3.5 proceeds in two steps. The first step introduces useful notation for
describing parts of message schedules, and proves some deterministic properties regarding these
concepts. The second step leverages these definitions and properties in making the core probabilistic
arguments.
Definitions and Deterministic Properties Each node keeps a counter called phase. This
counter is initialized to 0 and is incremented with each ack event. Given a message schedule and
8This summary is eliding some subtle details tackled in the full analysis concerning which broadcasts are guaranteed
to be received during a target group. But these details are not important for understanding the main logic of this
argument.
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node u, we can divide the schedule into phases with respect to u based on u’s local phase counter.
In more detail, label the acku events in the schedule, a1, a2, a3.... For each i ≥ 1, we define phase
i (with respect to u) to be the schedule fragment that starts with acknowledgment ai and includes
all events up to but not including ai+1. If no such ai+1 exists (i.e., if ai is the last acku event in the
execution), we consider phase i undefined and consider u to only have i− 1 phases in this schedule.
Notice, by our model definition, during a given phase i, all non-crashed nodes receive the message
broadcast as part of the ack that starts the phase.
We partition a given node u’s phases into groups, which we define with respect to the constant c
used in the algorithm definition as part of the logic for resetting the nodes’ active flag. In particular,
we partition the phases into groups of size c. For a given node u, phases 1 to c define group 1,
phases c + 1 to 2c define group 2, and, more generally, for all i ≥ 1, phases (i − 1)c + 1 to i · c
define group i. Notice, by the definition of our algorithm, a node only updates its active flag at
the beginning of each group. Therefore, the messages sent by a give node during a given one of its
groups are either all nop messages, or all non-nop messages.
We now introduce the higher level concept of a run, which will prove useful going forward.
Definition 3.6. Fix an execution α with corresponding message schedule msg[α], an integer x ≥ 2,
and a node u. We call a subsequence β of msg[α] an x-run for u if it satisfies the following three
properties:
1. β starts and ends with an acku event,
2. β contains x total acks for u, and
3. no other node has more than x acks in β.
We now show that for any x, any sufficiently long (defined with respect to x) fragment from a
message schedule will contain an x-run for some node:
Lemma 3.7. Fix an execution α and integer x ≥ 2. Let γ be any subsequence of the corresponding
message schedule msg[α] that includes at least n · x ack events. There exists a subsequence β of γ
that is an x-run for some node u.
Proof. Because γ contains n · x total acks, a straightforward counting argument provides that at
least one node v has at least x acks in γ. Consider the the subsequence γ′ of γ that starts with the
first ackv event and ends with the x
th such ackv event. (That is, we remove the prefix of γ before
the first ackv and the suffix after the x
th ackv event.)
It is clear that γ′ satisfies the first properties of our definition of an x-run for v. If it also
satisfies the third property (that no other node has more than x acks in γ′), then we are done:
setting β ← γ′ satisfies the lemma statement.
On the other hand, if γ′ does not satisfy the third property, there must exist some node u that
has more than x ack events in γ′. In this case, we can apply the above argument recursively to u
and γ′, identifying a subsequence of γ′ that starts with the first acku and ends after the x
th such
event. The resulting γ′′ satisfies the first two properties of the definition of an x-run for u. If it
also satisfies the third property, we are done. Otherwise, we can recurse again on γ′′.
Because each such recursive application of this argument strictly reduces the size of the sub-
sequence (at the very least, you are trimming off the first and last ack), and the original γ has a
bounded number of events, the recursion must eventually arrive at a subsequence that satisfies all
three properties of the x-run definition.
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We next prove an additional useful property of x-runs. In particular, a (2c+ 1)-run defined for
some node u is long enough that it must contain all phases of at least one of u’s groups. Identifying
complete groups of this type will be key to the later probabilistic algorithms.
Lemma 3.8. Let β be a (2c+1)-run for some node u. It follows that β contains all of the phases
for at least one of u’s groups (i.e., a complete group for u).
Proof. Because x = 2c+1, β must contain at least 2c+1 acku events. It follows that it contains at
least 2c of node u’s phases (extra final ack of the 2c + 1 ensures that all of the events that define
phase 2c of the run are included in the run). Because each node u group consists of c phases, any
sequence of 2c phases must include all c phase of at least one full group.
We next introduce the notion of a clean group, and establish that the occurence of a clean group
guarantees that we arrive at the termination state from our main theorem.
Definition 3.9. Let β be a complete group for some node u. We say β is clean if the following
two properties are satisfied:
1. Node u sets active to true at the beginning of the group described by β.
2. For every recvu(m) event that occurs in the first c− 1 phases of β, m is a nop message. (We
do not restrict the messages received during the final phase of the clean group.)
Lemma 3.10. Fix some execution α. Assume fragment β from α is a clean group for some node u.
It follows that by the end of β all nodes have either crashed, decided, or received a decide message.
Proof. Fix some α, β and u as specified by the lemma statement. Let b be the consensus value
u adopts for the first phase of the clean group. Because u only receives nop messages during all
but the last phase of a clean group, we know u will not change this value again in this group until
(potentially) the last phase. As we will now argue, however, it will have already decided before this
last phase, so the fact that u might receive values in that phase is inconsequential.
In more detail, let cˆ
(b)
u and cˆ
(1−b)
u be the largest counter values that u has seen for b and 1 − b,
respectively, by the time it completes the ack that begins the first phase. Because we just assumed
that u adopts b at this point, we know cˆ
(b)
u ≥ cˆ(1−b)u . Furthermore, because u only receives nop
messages, we know that in every phase starting with phase 2 of the group, u will either increment
the counter associated b or send a decide message. The largest counter associated with 1 − b will
not increase beyond cˆ
(1−b)
u during these phases.
It follows that if u has not yet sent a decide message by the start of phase k + 2, it will see
during the ack event that starts this phase that its largest counter for b is k larger than the largest
counter for 1−b. Accordingly, during this phase u will send a decide message. During the ack event
that starts k + 3, u will receive this ack and decide. At this point, all other nodes have received
its decide message as well. Because this is the last phase of the group, it is possible that u receives
non-nop messages from other nodes—but at this point, this is too late to have an impact as u has
already decided and halted. (It is here that we see why k+3 is the right value for the group length
c.)
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Randomized Analysis In Part 1 of this analysis we introduced several useful definitions and
execution properties. These culminated with the argument in Lemma 3.10 that if we ever get a
clean group in an execution, then we will have achieved the desired termination property. Our
goal in this second part of the analysis is to leverage the tools from the preceding part to prove,
with high probability, that the algorithm will generate a clean group after not too many acks are
scheduled.
On Network Size Assumptions. If n = 1, then all that is required for the single node u to experience
a clean group is for it to set active to true. By Lemma 3.10, it will then decide and halt in the
group that follows. By the definition of the algorithm, this occurs with probability 1/2 at the
beginning of each group, as u initializes nu ← 2, and this will never change. Therefore: with high
probability, u will decide within O(log n) groups (and therefore, O(c log n) scheduled acks), and
with probability 1, it will decide in the limit. This satisfies our liveness theorem. In the analysis
that follows, therefore, we will assume n > 1.
On Independence Between the Schedule and Random Choices. According to our model assumptions
(Section 2), the scheduler is provided no advance information about the nodes’ state or the contents
of the messages they send. All the scheduler learns is the input assignment, and whether or not
a given node sent some message (but not the message contents) as part of the steps it takes
for a given init or recv event. By the definition of our algorithm, however, until it halts, each
node sends a message when initialized and after every ack, regardless of its random choices or
the specific contents of the messages its receives. It follows that the scheduler learns nothing new
about the nodes’ states beyond their input values until the first node halts—at which point, some
additional information might be inferred. For a node to halt, however, means it has already sent
a decide message and received an ack for this message, meaning that we have already satisfied
the desired termination property at this point. Accordingly, in the analysis that follows, we can
treat the scheduler’s choices as independent of the nodes’ random choices. This allows us to fix
the schedule first and then reason probabilistically about the messages sent during the schedule,
without worrying about dependence between the schedule and those choices.9
In analyzing the probability of a group ending up clean, a key property is whether or not the
nodes participating in that group all have good estimates of the network size (e.g., their nv values
used in setting their active flags). We call a group with good estimates a calibrated group. The
formal definition of this property requires some care to ensure it exactly matches how we later
study it:
Definition 3.11. Fix an execution α. Let β be a complete group for some node u in the message
schedule msg[α]. Let Pβ be the set of nodes that have at least one of their messages received by u
in the first c − 1 phases of u’s group, let nβ = |Pβ |, and for each v ∈ Pβ, let tv be the event in
msg[α] that starts the node v group that sends the first of its messages received by u in β. We say
that group β is calibrated if for every v ∈ Pβ: the value nv used in event tv to probabilistically set
v’s active flag is of size at least nβ.
Notice in the above that if Pβ is empty than the property is vacuously true. Another key
property of calibration is that it is determined entirely by the message schedule. That is, given an
prefix of a message schedule, you can correctly determine the network size estimation of all nodes
9Technically speaking, in the analysis above, we imagine, without loss of generality, that the scheduler creates an
infinite schedule that describes how it wants the execution to unfold until it learns the first node halts. At that point,
it can modify the schedule going forward.
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at the end of that prefix without needing to know anything about their input values or random
choices. This follows because network size estimates are based on two things: the number of UIDs
from which you have received messages (of any type), and other nodes’ reported estimates (which
are included on all message types). As argued above, the only thing impacted by the node random
choices and inputs are the types of messages they send, not when they send.
Therefore, given a message schedule and a group within the message schedule, we can determine
whether or not that group is calibrated independent of the nodes’ random choices, supporting the
following:
Lemma 3.12. Let α be a message schedule generated by the scheduler. Let β be a (2c+1)-run for
some node u in α, and γ be a complete group for u in β. If γ is calibrated, then the probability that
γ is clean is at least 1/(64n).
Proof. Fix some α, γ and β and u as specified by the lemma statement. Fix Pγ , nγ , and the tv
events, as specified in our definition of calibrated (Definition 3.11).
We note that if Pγ is empty, then the only condition that must hold for γ to be clean is for u
to set active to true. This occurs with probability 1/nu ≥ 1/n > 1/(64n)—satisfying the lemma.
Continuing, we consider the case where Pγ is non-empty. Fix any v ∈ Pγ . We begin by bounding
the total number of v’s groups that might send a message that is received by u in γ. To do so, we
note that because γ is a (2c + 1)-run, v cannot have more than 2c + 1 ack events in γ. Therefore,
no more than 3 of v’s groups can overlap γ (as each group requires c ack events), and therefore
there are at most 3 groups that both overlap γ and deliver a message from v to u in this group.
We now lower bound the probability that v sets active to false (and therefore only sends nop
messages to u) at the beginning of all of these groups. We consider two cases based on the value
of nγ . If nγ = 1, then the fact that this group is calibrated only tells us that nv ≥ 1—which is not
useful. In this case, however, we note that the definition of the algorithm guarantees that nv ≥ 2,
as it initializes nv to 2 and these estimates never decrease. We can therefore crudely lower bound
the probability that v sets active to false in all overlapping groups, by noting that it must be at
least (1− 1/nv)3 ≥ (1− 1/2)3 = 1/8 > 1/(64n)—satisfying the lemma.
We now consider the case where nγ > 1. In this case, we leverage the definition of calibrated,
which tells us that at the beginning of the first of these overlapping groups, v has a network estimate
nv ≥ nγ , and that this remains true for all overlapping groups as these estimates never decrease.
Therefore, the probability that v delivers only nop messages to u during the first c− 1 phases of γ
is at least: (1− 1/nv)3 ≥ (1− 1/nγ)3.
Combining the above probability with the straightforward observation that u is active during γ
with probability at least 1/n (as n is the largest possible network size estimate), yields the following
probability that γ is clean:
(1/n) ·
∏
v∈Pγ
(1− (1/nv))3 ≥ (1/n) ·
∏
v∈Pγ
(1− (1/nγ))3
= (1/n) ·
(
(1− (1/nγ))3
)|Pγ |
= (1/n) · (1− (1/nγ))3nγ
≥ (1/n) · (1/4)(3nγ )/nγ
≥ 1/(64n),
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as required by the lemma statement.
We have established that if a group is calibrated then it has a good chance (≈ 1/n) of being
clean and therefore ensuring termination. To leverage this result, however, we must overcome two
issues. The first is proving that calibrated groups are sufficiently common in a given schedule. The
second is dealing with dependencies between different groups. Assume, for example, we want to
calculate the probability that at least one group from among a collection of target groups is clean.
Assume some node u has a group that overlaps multiple groups in this collection. If u sets active to
true in this group this reduces the probability of cleanliness for several groups in this collection. In
other words, cleanness probability is not necessarily independent between different target groups.
On Good Target Groups. We overcomes these challenges by proving that any sufficiently long
message schedule must contain a sufficient number of calibrated and pairwise independent target
groups.
To do so, let α be some message schedule generated by the scheduler that contains qnx ack
events, where x = 2c + 1 and q = n + gn2c ln n, for any constant g ≥ 512. Partition this schedule
in q segments each containing nx ack events. Label these segments s1, s2, ..., sq.
By Lemma 3.7, each segment si contains an x-run for some node ui. Applying Lemma 3.8, it
follows that this x-run contains at least one complete group for ui. We call this complete group
the target group for si, and label it ti. (If there are more than one complete groups for ui in the
x-run, then we set ti to the first such group in the run.) Let T = {t1, t2, ..., tq} be the complete set
of these target groups.
We turn our attention to this set T of target groups. To study their useful for inducing termi-
nation, we will use the notion of calibrated introduced earlier, as well as the following formal notion
of non-overlapping:
Definition 3.13. Fix two target groups ti and tj. We say ti and tj are non-overlapping if there does
not exist a group that has at least one recv event in ti and tj . If ti and tj are not non-overlapping,
then we say they overlap.
Our goal is to identify a subset of these target groups that are good—a property which we define
with respect to calibration and non-overlapping properties as follows:
Definition 3.14. Let T ′ ⊆ T be a subset of the q target groups. We say the groups in T ′ are
good if: (1) every ti ∈ T ′ is calibrated; and (2) for every ti, tj ∈ T ′, where i 6= j, ti and tj are
non-overlapping.
Notice that both the calibration and non-overlapping status of groups are a function entirely of
the message schedule. Therefore, given a message schedule, we can partition it into segments and
target groups as described above, and label the status of these target groups without needing to
consider the nodes’ random bits.
To do so, we first prove a useful bound on the prevalence of calibration in T . The core idea in
the following is that every time a target group fails calibration, all nodes increase their network
estimates. Clearly, this can only occur n times before all estimates are the maximum possible
value of n, after which calibration is trivial. We then apply this result in making a more involved
argument that on the frequency of good groups.
Lemma 3.15. At most n groups in T are not calibrated.
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Proof. Fix some ti ∈ T that is not calibrated. Let Pi be the set of nodes that deliver at least one
message to ui in the first c− 1 phases of ti. By the definition of calibration, if ti is not calibrated,
then at least one node v ∈ Pi starts its relevant group with a network estimate nv < |Pi|.
During the first c − 1 phases of ti, node ui receives a message from every node in Pi (this is
the definition of Pi). This means that by the start of the final phase of ti, ui’s network estimate
is of size at least |Pi|. The message that ui sends in the final phase therefore will be labelled with
this network size. By the end of this final phase, all non-crashed processes will have received this
estimate. Therefore, all these processes will update their network size to be at least |Pi| at the
beginning of their next phases.
At this point, |Pi| is now a minimum network size for the entire network. Therefore, if a
subsequent group tj is not calibrated, then it must be the case that |Pj | > |Pi|, and by the end of
this group, the minimum network size for the entire network will increase to at least |Pj |. Clearly,
this increase process can happen at most n times before the entire network has the maximum
possible network size of n, and every subsequent target group is trivially calibrated.
Lemma 3.16. There exists a subset T ′ ⊆ T such that the groups in T ′ are good and |T ′| ≥ gn lnn.
Proof. Fix some T as specified by the lemma statement. We approach this proof from an algorithmic
perspective. That is, we describe below an algorithm that identifies a good subset T ′ of T , and then
argue the subset produced by the algorithm is sufficiently large.
for i← 1 to q do
if ti is calibrated then
ℓi ← good
else
ℓi ← bad
for i← 1 to q do
if ℓi = good then
for j ← i+ 1 to q do
if ti overlaps tj then tj ← bad
T ′ ← {ti | ℓi = good}
We argue that T ′ is good. First we note that by the definition of the algorithm, when a label
gets set to bad it can never again be changed back to good.
Next we note that if ℓi = good when T
′ is defined in the final step, then it could not be the case
that ℓi was set to bad in the first for loop, as, by our first note, this would ensure that ℓi remained
bad. Therefore, ℓi must have been set to good in the first for loop, indicating it is calibrated.
Now we consider overlaps. If ℓi ends up good then it must have been good when the second for
loop arrived at this value. It follows that no preceding group overlaps ti. During this iteration, the
nested for loop will permanently set to bad and succeeding target groups that ti overlaps. Combined,
it follows that if ℓi = good at this point, then for every tj that overlaps ti (i 6= j), ℓj = bad before
the second for loop completes.
We conclude that T ′ is a good subset of T . We now consider its sizes. By Lemma 3.15, we
know that the first for loop marks at most n groups bad with the rest initialized to good.
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Now consider an iteration i of the second for loop that finds ℓi = good. We can bound the
number of groups the inner for loop then sets to bad. For each v 6= ui, v can have at most one
group that delivers messages to both ti and future groups. Call this group gv. Because gv delivers
c total messages, the maximum number of future groups it can deliver messages to is at most c− 1.
In the worst case, each v 6= ui therefore causes no more than c − 1 future groups to be labelled
bad. There are n − 1 total possible nodes, so at most (n − 1)(c − 1) future groups get labelled
bad for each good group identified by the second for loop. Therefore, if we divide these groups by
(n− 1)(c − 1) + 1, we get a lower bound on the number of good groups that remain:
q − n
(n − 1)(c − 1) + 1 ≥
q − n
nc
=
(n+ gn2c ln n)− n
nc
= gn ln n,
as claimed by the lemma statement.
The target groups in the set T ′ identified by Lemma 3.16 are calibrated and pairwise non-
overlapping. By Lemma 3.12, each such group has a reasonable probability of being clean. We will
conclude our analysis by arguing that with high probability at least one will end up clean.
Lemma 3.17. Let T ′ ⊆ T be a subset of the target groups T such that the groups in T ′ are good
and |T ′| ≥ gn ln n, for some constant g ≥ 512. Then with high probability in n: at least one group
in T ′ is clean.
Proof. Fix some T ′ as specified by the lemma statement. We describe the cleanliness of each ti ∈ T ′
with a random indicator variable Xi, where Xi = 1 indicates ti is clean, and Xi = 0 indicates it is
not clean. By Lemma 3.12, we know that for each ti ∈ T ′: P(Xi = 1) ≥ 1/(64n).
We next argue that these random variables are independent. To see why, notice that the only
random choices made by a given node when reseting active at the start of each group. Each such
choice is made with independent randomness: i.e., the choice for one group is independent from
the choice made for any other group. For any ti, tj ∈ T ′, where i 6= j, by the definition T ′, there
are no groups that overlap both ti and tj . Therefore, the random choices relevant to determine if
ti is clean are distinct from the random choices that will determine if tj is clean. It follows that Xi
and Xj are independent.
Let Y =
∑
ti∈T ′ Xi be the total number of clean groups. It follows by linearity of expectation,
Lemma 3.12, and our assumption on the size of T ′:
E(Y ) = E

∑
ti∈T ′
Xi

 = ∑
ti∈T ′
E(Xi) ≥ |T ′|/(64n) ≥ (g/64) ln n.
Because theX indicators are independent, we can apply a Chernoff bound to concentrate around
this expectation.10 In particular, let µ = E(Y ) ≥ (g/64) ln n. We bound the probability that Y is
a constant factor smaller than expected:
P(Y ≤ µ/2) ≤ e− (1/2)
2(g/64) lnn
2
= e−(g/512) lnn
= 1/ng/512
≤ 1/n
10We use the following loose form of the bound that holds for µ = E(Y ) when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1: P(Y ≤ (1−δ)µ) ≤ e−
δ2µ
2 .
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Given our assumption on g, we know µ/2 ≥ 1. Therefore, Pr(Y ≤ µ/2) is less than or equal to
the probability that no group is clean.
We can now pull together the pieces to prove our main liveness result (Theorem 3.5):
Proof (of Theorem 3.5). We handled the case where n = 1 at the beginning of the liveness analysis.
Here we consider only n > 1, the case for which the above lemma hold. To prove the first part of
the theorem, fix some constant g ≥ 512, and define q and x as in the above definitions of segments
and target groups. Consider the first qnx = (n + gn2c ln n) · n · (2c + 1) = Θ(n3 ln n) ack events
of the message schedule generated by the scheduler. We can extract a set T containing q target
groups from this prefix of the message schedule as described above.
By Lemma 3.16, there exists a subset T ′ ⊆ T such that the groups in T ′ are good and |T ′| ≥
gn ln n. By Lemma 3.17, with high probability, at least one of these target groups is clean. Finally,
by Lemma 3.10: if any group is clean, then by the end of that group every process has either
crashed, decided, or received a decide message.
The second part of the theorem, which addresses termination in the limit, we first note that
if we continually apply the argument from Lemma 3.17 to fresh batches of groups, the probability
that we do not generate a clean group approaches 0 in the limit. Combined with Lemma 3.10, this
provides the needed probabilistic termination condition.
3.4 Removing the Assumption of Unique IDs
The consensus algorithm described in this section assumes unique IDs. We now show how to
eliminate this assumption by describing a strategy that generates unique IDs w.h.p., and discuss
how to use this as a subroutine in our consensus algorithm.
We make use of a simple tiebreaking mechanism as follows: Each node u proceeds by iteratively
extending a (local) random bit string that eventually becomes unique among the nodes. Initially,
u broadcasts bit b1, which is initialized to 1 (at all nodes), and each time u samples a new bit b,
it appends b to its current string and broadcasts the result. For instance, suppose that u’s most
recently broadcast bit string is b1 . . . bi. Upon receiving ack(b1 . . . bi), node u checks if it has received
a message identical to b1 . . . bi. If it did not receive such a message, then u adopts b1 . . . bi as its ID
and stops. Otherwise, some distinct node must have sampled the same sequence of bits as u and,
in this case, the ID b1 . . . bi is considered to be already taken. (Note that nodes do not take receive
events for their own broadcasts.) Node u continues by sampling its (i+1)-th bit bi+1 uniformly at
random, and then broadcasts the string b1 . . . bibi+1, and so forth.
We first show that the algorithm is safe in the sense that no two nodes ever assign themselves
the same ID:
Lemma 3.18. Suppose that nodes u and v both terminate Algorithm 3. Then it holds that idu 6= idv.
Proof. Consider an execution α and the corresponding message schedule msg[α]. Suppose, in
contrary, that idu = idv. Let ru and rv denote the number of acks that u respectively v receive
before assigning an ID and, without loss of generality, assume ru ≤ rv. Clearly, if ru < rv, then
idv is at least one bit longer than idu, thus idv > idu. Now suppose that ru = rv, i.e., both u and
v receive the same number of acks. Let tu and tv be the events in msg[α] where u and v receive
their respective ru-th ack and, without loss of generality, assume that tu precedes tv in msg[α]. By
assumption, u was non-faulty until receiving its ack in event tu and hence v must have received
u’s broadcast message (idu) before receiving its own ack in step tv. Since u and v have generated
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Algorithm 3 Generating unique IDs using randomized tiebreaking. Code for node u.
1: Initialization:
2: b1 ← 1; R← ∅; i = 1
3: bcast(b1)
4: On Receiving ack(b1 . . . bi)
5: if (b1 . . . bi) /∈ R then
6: idu ← (b1 . . . bi)
7: adopt idu as ID and terminate
8: i← i+ 1
9: sample bit bi uniformly at random
10: bcast(b1 . . . bi)
11: On Receiving message (b′1 · · · b′j), (j ≥ 1):
12: if u has not yet assigned idu then add (b
′
1 · · · b′j) to R
the same bits by assumption, the if-conditional ensures that v samples at least one additional bit
compared to u, providing a contradiction.
Next, we show liveness in Lemma 3.19 by arguing that each node receives an ID within its first
O(log n) broadcast events with high probability.
Lemma 3.19. With high probability, each node broadcasts at most O(log n) times before choosing
an ID in Line 6 of Algorithm 3.
Proof. Consider an execution α and assume, towards a contradiction, that a node u executes at least
⌈4 log2 n⌉+ 2 broadcasts. Let (b1 . . . b⌈4 log2 n⌉+1) be the (⌈4 log2 n⌉+ 1)-length bit string broadcast
by u, and let t be the event where u receives ack(b1 . . . b⌈4 log2 n⌉+1) for the corresponding broadcast.
By assumption, u does not pass the if-condition in event t and thus there is a set of nodes W
(u /∈W ) that also broadcast bit strings of length ⌈4 log2 n⌉+1 and whose messages are received by
u before event t. While the first bit b1 is initialized to 1 by every node, the string b2 . . . b⌈4 log2 n⌉+1)
corresponds to a uniform random sample from a range of size at least n4. The probability that v
has sampled precisely the same ⌈4 log2 n⌉ bits as u (and hence broadcast (b1b2 . . . b⌈4 log2 n⌉+1)) is
at most 1n4 . Taking a union bound over all other nodes in W and over all possible choices for u,
shows that all nodes will execute at most ⌈4 log2 n+ 1⌉ broadcasts with high probability.
From the previous two lemmas, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3.20. Consider an execution α of the tiebreaking algorithm. Let tu be an event in the
message schedule msg[α] such that node u is scheduled for Ω(log n) ack events before tu. Then, for
each correct node u, it holds that u has a unique ID of O(log n) bits with high probability at tu.
Equipped with Theorem 3.20 we can execute the consensus algorithm in networks without
unique IDs, by instructing each node u to first execute Algorithm 3, while locally buffering all
messages received from nodes already executing the consensus algorithm; however, u does not yet
process these messages. Once u obtains an ID, it performs the initialization step of the consensus
algorithm and locally simulates taking receive steps for all previously buffered messages.
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4 Almost-Everywhere Agreement
In the previous section, we showed how to solve consensus in O(n3 log n) events. Here we show how
to improve this bound by a near linear factor by loosening the agreement guarantees. In more detail,
we consider a weaker variant of consensus, introduced in [18], called almost-everywhere agreement.
This variation relaxes the agreement property of consensus such that o(n) nodes are allowed to
decide on conflicting values, as long as the remaining nodes all decide the same value. For many
problems that use consensus as a subroutine, this relaxed agreement property is sufficient.
In more detail, we present an algorithm for solving almost-everywhere agreement in the abstract
MAC layer model when nodes start with arbitrary (not necessarily binary) input values. The
algorithm consists of two phases; see Algorithm 4 for the pseudo code.
Phase 1: In this phase, nodes try to obtain an estimate of the network size by performing local coin
flipping experiments. Each node u records in a variable X the number of times that its coin comes
up tails before observing the first heads. Then, u broadcasts its value of X once, and each node
updates X to the highest outcome that it has seen until it receives the ack for its broadcast. We
show that, for all nodes in a large set called EST , variable X is an approximation of log2(n) with
an additive O(log log n) term by the end of Phase 1, and hence N := 2X is a good approximation
of the network size n for any node in EST .
Phase 2: Next, we use X and N as parameters of a randomly rotating leader election procedure.
Each node decides after T = Θ(N log3(N) log log(N)) rounds, where each round corresponds to one
iteration of the for-loop in Algorithm 4. (Note that due to the asynchronous nature of the abstract
MAC layer model, different nodes might be executing in different rounds at the same point in time.)
We now describe the sequence of steps comprising a round in more detail: A node u becomes active
with probability 1/Nu at the start of each round.
11 If it is active, then u samples a random rank ρ
from a range polynomial in Xu, and broadcasts a message 〈r, ρ, val〉 where val refers to its current
consensus input value. To ensure that the scheduler cannot derive any information about whether
a node is active in a round, inactive nodes simply broadcast a dummy message with infinite rank.
While an (active or inactive) node v waits for its ack for round r, it keeps track of all received
messages and defers processing of a message sent by a node in some round r′ > r until the event
in which v itself starts round r′. On the other hand, if a received message was sent in r′ < r, then
v simply discards that late message as it has already completed r′. Node v uses the information of
messages originating from the same round r to update its consensus input value, if it receives such
a message from an active node that has chosen a smaller rank than its own. (Recall that inactive
nodes have infinite rank.) After v has finished processing the received messages, it moves on the
next round.
We first provide some intuition why it is insufficient to focus on a round r where the “earliest”
node is also active: Ideally, we want the node w1 that is the first to receive its ack for round r to
be active and to have the smallest rank among all active nodes in round r, as this will force all
other (not-yet decided) nodes to adopt w1’s value when receiving their own round r ack, ensuring
a.e. agreement. However, it is possible that w1 and also the node w2 that receives its round r ack
right after w1, are among the few nodes that ended up with a small (possibly constant) value of X
after Phase 1. We cannot use the size of EST to reason about this probability, as some nodes are
much likelier to be in EST than others, depending on the schedule of events in Phase 1. In that
case, it could happen that both w1 and w2 become active and choose a rank of 1. Note that it is
11We use the convention Nu when referring to the local variable N of a specific node u.
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possible that the receive steps of their broadcasts are scheduled such that roughly half of the nodes
receive w1’s message before w2’s message, while the other half receive w2’s message first. If w1 and
w2 have distinct consensus input values, then it can happen that both consensus values gain large
support in the network as a result.
To avoid this pitfall, we focus on a set of rounds where all nodes not in EST have already
terminated Phase 2 (and possibly decided on a wrong value): from that point onwards, only nodes
with sufficiently large values of X and N keep trying to become active. We can show that every
node in EST has a probability of at least Ω(1/(n log n)) to become active and a probability of
Ω(1/ log n) to have chosen the smallest rank among all nodes that are active in the same round.
Thus, when considering a sufficiently large set of (asynchronous) rounds, we can show that the
event, where the first node in EST that receives its ack in round r becomes active and also chooses
a rank smaller than the rank of any other node active in the same round, happens with probability
1− o(1).
In the remainder of this section, we will formalize the above discussion by proving the following
main theorem regarding this algorithm:
Theorem 4.1. With high probability, the following two properties are true of our almost-everywhere
consensus algorithm: (1) within O(n2 log4 n · log log n) scheduled ack events, every node has either
crashed, decided, or will decided after it is next scheduled; (b) all but at most o(n) nodes that decide,
decide the same value.
We begin our proof of Theorem 4.1 by analyzing the properties of variables N and X. We say
that a node u fails in round r if u performs its round r broadcast in some event, but crashes before
receiving its corresponding ack; otherwise, we say u is alive in r. Note that there is no guarantee
about which nodes receive a failing node’s final broadcast.
Lemma 4.2. There exists a set of nodes EST of size at least
(
1−O
(
log logn
logn
))
n − f , such that
the following hold with probability at least 1− o(1):
(a) for all u ∈ EST , when u receives its ack for its first broadcast, it holds that
n
log2 n
≤ Nu ≤ n log n and log2 n− log2(log n) ≤ Xu ≤ log2 n+ log2 log n; (1)
(b) for all v /∈ EST , we have Nv ≤ n2 log2 n .
Our proof of Lemma 4.2 requires a technical result on the distribution of observed coin flips.
Claim 4.3. Consider any set S of at least 2n log lognlogn correct nodes and let X
∗ = max{Xu | u ∈ S},
where Xu refers to u’s variable before node u receives any messages in Phase 1. It holds with
probability at least 1−O(1/ log n) that log2 n− log2(log n) ≤ X∗ ≤ log2 n+ log2 log n.
Proof of Claim 4.3. Observe that Xu is geometrically distributed with parameter
1
2 and hence
Pr [Xu ≥ log2 n+ log2 log n] ≤ 2− log2 n−log2 logn =
1
n log n
.
Taking a union abound over all nodes in S and noting that |S| ≤ n, implies that X∗ ≤ log2 n +
log2 log n with probability at least 1− 1/ log n, proving the upper bound.
25
For the lower bound, we first bound the probability that the estimate of a single node u ∈ S is
above the required threshold. We get
Pr [Xu≥ log2 n− log2(log n)] ≥ Pr [Xu=log2 n− log2(log n)] = 2− log2 n+log2(log n)−1 =
log n
2n
,
where the second last equality follows from the properties of the geometric distribution. Considering
the complementary event, namely that Xu is below the threshold, and taking a union bound over
the set S, yields
Pr [∀u ∈ S : Xu < log2 n− log2(log n)] ≤
(
1− log n
2n
)2n log logn/ logn
≤ exp
(
−2n log n log log n
2n log n
)
,
thus completing the proof of Claim 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We note that the values N are powers of 2 and, since any node not in EST
must have a value of X strictly smaller than for any node that is in EST , Part (b) follows. Thus
we focus on (a) in the remainder of the proof.
To obtain a lower bound on the size of EST , we define the set S in the premise of Claim 4.3
to consist of the first
⌈
2n log logn
logn
⌉
nodes that receive the ack for their broadcast in Phase 1 of the
algorithm. Let S¯ be the set of alive nodes that are not in S. Then, all nodes in S¯ are guaranteed
to receive the maximum value broadcast by nodes in S before completing Phase 1. Observe that
any node u ∈ S¯ must have Nu ≤ n log n by instantiating Claim 4.3 with set S¯. Since EST contains
at least all nodes in S¯, the lemma follows.
We now focus on Phase 2 of the algorithm which is conceptually structured into asynchronous
rounds, where each round consists of one iteration of the for-loop of Algorithm 4. When talking
about some event E in round r that concerns a set of nodes U , we refer to the collection of events
in the message schedule where the nodes in U execute the corresponding events. We say that
u ∈ EST is the earliest node in round r, if u receives its ack for its round r broadcast before all
other nodes in the message schedule. Note that which node is the earliest depends on the scheduler
and can change from round to round.
Lemma 4.4. With probability 1−O(1/ log n), there exists a set Γ of at least Ω
(
n log2 n log log n
)
rounds in which no node crashes and where the following hold:
(a) in every round r ∈ Γ, at most 4 log2 n nodes in EST become active in r, and
(b) all nodes in EST remain undecided until the last round of Γ.
Proof. For Part (a), recall from Lemma 4.2.(a) that each node u ∈ EST becomes active with
probability 1/Nu ≤ log2 nn and hence the expected number of active nodes is at most log2 n. Since
nodes become active independently, an application of a standard Chernoff bound [37] shows that
at most 4 log2 n nodes in EST become active with high probability.
We now consider Part (b). We know that the number of rounds executed by any node v /∈ EST
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is at most
Tv =
⌈
cNv log
3(Nv) log log(Nv)
⌉
≤ cn
2 log2 n
log3
(
n
2 log2 n
)
log log
(
n
2 log2 n
)
+ 1
(by Lem. 4.2.(b))
≤ 19
36
cn
log n
log3
(
n
2 log n
)
log log
(
n
2 log n
)
≤ 19
36
cn log2 n log log n. (2)
On the other hand, Lemma 4.2.(a) tells us that any u ∈ EST executes at least
Tu ≥ cNu log3(Nu) log log(Nu) ≥ cn
log2 n
log3
(
n
log2 n
)
log log
(
n
log2 n
)
rounds. For sufficiently large n, it holds that log3
(
n
log2 n
)
≥ 56 log3 n and similarly log log
(
n
log2 n
)
≥
5
6 log log n. Thus, simplifying the right-hand side in the above inequality yields
Tu ≥ 2536cn log2 n log log n.
Recalling (2), it follows that there is a set Γf of at least Tu− Tv ≥ c6n log2 n log log n rounds where
only nodes in EST execute the code in the for-loop. Since nodes can fail in at most n − 1 rounds
of the algorithm, it follows that there exists a subset Γ ⊆ Γf of size at least Ω
(
n log2 n log log n
)
,
as required.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that there is a set EST as stated in Lemma 4.2 and assume that the set of
rounds Γ implied by Lemma 4.4 exists. Then there exists a round r ∈ Γ such that, with probability
1−O(1/ log n), the earliest node is alive in r, becomes active, and has the minimum rank.
Proof. Below, we restrict our attention to the set of rounds Γ where only nodes in EST participate.
We will first lower bound the probability that an active node has the lowest rank among all nodes
active in round r ∈ Γ.
Condition on the event that the earliest node u is active in r. Let q be the probability that
u chooses a unique minimum rank among active nodes and consider the threshold L = log2 n −
log2(log n). Recall from (1), that all nodes in EST choose their rank from a range [1, ℓ] where
ℓ ≥ L4. Let “ρu min” be the event that u chooses the smallest rank in this round. We get
q = Pr [ρu min | u ∈ Active] ≥ Pr
[
ρu min | u ∈ Active, ρu ≤ L4
]
· Pr
[
ρu ≤ L4 | u ∈ Active
]
. (3)
We now prove that q ≥ 120 log2 n . For all active v ∈ EST , it holds that ρv ≤ (log2 n+ log2 log n)
4 ≤
2 log42 n. Together with the fact that L ≥ 12 log2 n, this implies that
Pr
[
ρu ≤ L4 | u ∈ Active
]
≥ L
4
2 log42 n
≥ 1
4
. (4)
Next, we will derive a bound on Pr
[
ρu min | u ∈ Active, ρu ≤ L4
]
. Lemma 4.4.(a) tells us that there
are at most 4 log2 n active nodes in any given round r ∈ Γ. Consider some active node v. If we
condition on all nodes choosing their rank from the range [1, L4], the probability that all nodes
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choose distinct ranks from the rank of v must be at least
(
1− 1L4
)4 log2 n
. In that case, a union
bound over the active nodes implies that, for the event dist, which occurs when all nodes have
unique ranks, we get
Pr
[
dist | u ∈ Active,∀v ∈ Active : ρv ≤ L4
]
≥
(
1− 1
L4
)4 log22 n ≥ 1−O (1/ log2 n) . (5)
Moreover, conditioning on the event that all active nodes choose ranks from [1, L4] does not increase
the probability of u choosing the smallest rank, which tells us that
Pr
[
ρu min | u ∈ Active, ρu ≤ L4
]
≥ Pr
[
ρu min | u ∈ Active,∀v ∈ Active : ρv ≤ L4
]
≥ Pr
[
ρu min | u ∈ Active,∀v ∈ Active : ρv ≤ L4, dist
](
1−O
(
1
log2 n
))
,
where the last inequality follows from (5). Conditioned on event dist and the premise of the lemma
of having at most 4 log2 n active nodes, the probability of u picking the smallest rank is at least
1/4 log2 n, i.e., Pr
[
ρu min | u ∈ Active,∀v ∈ Active : ρv ≤ L4, dist
] ≥ 14 log2 n . It follows that
Pr
[
ρu min | u ∈ Active, ρu ≤ L4
]
≥ 1
4 log2 n
(
1−O
(
1
log2 n
))
≥ 1
5 log2 n
,
Plugging the above bound and (4) into the right-hand side of (3) shows that q ≥ 120 log2 n .
Conditioned on Lemma 4.2.(a), we know that every node in EST , and in particular, the earliest
node u, has probability at least 1n logn of being active in any single round r ∈ Γ. We have
Pr [ρu min ∧ u ∈ Active] = Pr [ρu min | u ∈ Active] · Pr [u ∈ Active] ≥ q
n log n
≥ 1
20n log22 n
,
for any round r ∈ Γ and the respective earliest node u in r.
Recalling that Γ comprises Ω(n log2 n log log n) rounds, it follows that the event that, for none of
the rounds in Γ, the earliest node becomes the smallest ranked active node, happens with probability
at most (
1− 1
20n log22 n
)|Γ|
≤ exp
(
− |Γ|
20n log22 n
)
= O
(
1
log n
)
.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Validity follows since any value written to variable val was the input
value of some node.
For termination, notice the number of rounds executed by any node u depends on the value of
Tu = O(Nu log
3(Nu) log log(Nu)) in Phase 2. From Claim 4.3, we know that Nu ≤ n log n for all
nodes u with probability 1− o(1) and hence the maximum number of rounds executed by any node
u is O(n log4 n log log n), which results in the same bound for the total number of broadcasts by u.
Taking into account that there are n nodes, the claimed termination bound follows.
28
Conditioned on the properties of set EST (cf. Lemma 4.2), we now show that almost all nodes
decide on a common value. From Lemma 4.5 we know that with probability 1− o(1), there is a set
Γ containing a round r ∈ Γ, in which the earliest node u is active, non-faulty, and has the minimum
rank. Let t′ be the event when u receives the corresponding ack for its round r broadcast message
mu carrying valu. By Lemma 4.4.(b), we know that every node v ∈ EST is performing all rounds
in Γ and hence will receive u’s message mu in some receive event t
′
v that precedes t
′ in the message
schedule. Moreover, since u was the earliest node in round r, it follows that event t′v must be part
of some round r′ ≤ r (at v) and in particular must occur before v receives its ack for round r. If
r′ < r, then v defers the processing of message mu until v reaches round r; otherwise, if r
′ = r,
then v adopts u’s value when it receives its ack. By Lemma 4.4.(b), the nodes in EST execute all
rounds of Γ and hence all of them will adopt valu when receiving their ack in round r.
To complete the proof, we will argue that no node in EST changes its value after round r. For
the sake of a contradiction, suppose that there is some w ∈ EST that adopts some value z 6= valu
during an ack event t′w in some round rw > r. Moreover, assume that tw is the earliest such event
in the message schedule that is causally influenced by u’s round r broadcast event t. Since u has
the smallest rank in r, it follows that w must have received a message 〈r′, ρ′, x〉, which was sent by
some node u′ during its round r′ 6= r. First, observe that if r′ < r, then also r′ < rw and hence w
would have discarded that message in event tw. Now consider the case r
′ > r. Since only nodes
in EST perform broadcasts during the rounds in Γ, it follows that u′ ∈ EST , and hence by the
above argument we know that u′ must have broadcast some x 6= valu after having adopted valu
in its round r. This means that u′ updated its value in some event after round r but before tw,
contradicting the assumption that tw was the earliest event (after round r) in the message schedule
where such an update occurred. It follows that at least |EST |− f = n
(
1−O
(
log logn
logn
))
− f nodes
decide on a common value.
When applying Lemmas 4.2, 4.4, and 4.5 in the argument above, we condition on events each
of which happens with probability 1− o(1). Hence we can remove the conditioning while retaining
a probability of success of 1− o(1).
5 Lower Bound
We conclude our investigation by showing a separation between the abstract MAC layer model and
the related asynchronous message passing model. In more detail, we prove below that fault-tolerant
consensus with constant success probability is impossible in a variation of the asynchronous message
passing model where nodes are provided only a constant-fraction approximation of the network size
and communicate using (blind) broadcast. This bounds holds even if we assume no crashes and
provide nodes unique ids from a small set. Notice, in the abstract MAC layer model, we solve
consensus with broadcast under the harsher constraints of no network size information, no ids, and
crash failures. The difference is the fact that the broadcast primitive in the abstract MAC layer
model includes an acknowledgment. This acknowledgment is therefore revealed to be the crucial
element of the our model that allows algorithms to overcome lack of network information. We note
that this bound is a generalization of the result from [1], which proved deterministic consensus
was impossible under these constraints. In the proof of the theorem, we show that, for any given
randomized algorithm we can construct scenarios that are indistinguishable for the nodes, thus
causing conflicting decisions.
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Theorem 5.1. Consider an asynchronous network of n nodes that communicate by broadcast and
suppose that nodes are unaware of the network size n, but have knowledge of an integer that is
guaranteed to be a 2-approximation of n. No randomized algorithm can solve binary consensus with
a probability of success of at least 1− ǫ, for any constant ǫ < 2−√3. This holds even if nodes have
unique identifiers chosen from a range of size at least 2n and all nodes are correct.
Proof. In our proof we construct admissible executions by restricting ourselves to schedules that
are infinite sequences of layers (cf. [41]). For a given set of nodes S, we define a layer L(S) to
consist of an arbitrarily ordered sequence of nodes in S, say 〈u1, . . . , uk〉, followed by a sequence of
sets of received messages 〈M1, . . . ,Mk〉, where Mi denotes the set of messages received by node ui.
Layer L(S) defines a schedule where each ui takes a compute step (in the given order), in which it
can perform some local computation and broadcast a message. We conclude the layer by scheduling
each uj ∈ S to take sufficiently many receive steps to ensure that all messages in Mj are delivered.
We restrict the sets Mj such that each message m ∈Mj must have been broadcast in L(S) or some
layer preceding L(S) in the schedule.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is a randomized consensus algorithm that succeeds
with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ. Consider the n-node clique network H0 of nodes u1, . . . , un where each
node is equipped with some arbitrary unique identifier and all nodes start with consensus input
0. Moreover, nodes are given the network size estimate 2n. By a slight abuse of notation, we use
H0 to refer to both, the network and the set of nodes in the network. We specify the schedule σ0
to be the infinite sequence 〈L(H0), L(H0), . . . 〉 where layer L(H0) is such that all broadcasts by
nodes in H0 are received by all nodes in H0 in the very same layer in which they are sent. Since
σ0 results in an admissible execution according to the asynchronous broadcast model, there exists
a fixed integer t0 such that all nodes in H0 have decided with probability at least 1 − 1/n within
the first t0 steps of σ0. Validity and agreement tell us that, if nodes decide in the t0-step prefix σ
′
0
of σ0, their decision must be on 0 with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Similarly, we define a schedule σ1 = 〈L(H1), L(H1), . . . 〉 on a network H1 of n nodes where all
nodes start with input 1, a network size estimate of 2n, and nodes are given a set of unique IDs
disjoint from the IDs used for H0. By a similar argument as above, there is an integer t1 such that
the algorithm ensures a common decision on 1 with probability at least 1− ǫ, conditioned on nodes
deciding within t1 steps (which itself is bound to happen with probability ≥ 1 − 1/n); we denote
the corresponding schedule prefix by σ′1.
Now, we consider the clique network G on the set of nodes H0 ∪H1 where nodes in H0 have
input 0, nodes in H1 start with input 1, and the same set of IDs are assigned as above. Here nodes
are given the same network size estimate, i.e., 2n, as in networks H0 and H1, which unbeknownst
to them is the actual network size of G. We define an infinite “synchronous” schedule σ2 consisting
of layers such that, in each layer, all nodes in H0 ∪ H1 take compute steps in round-robin order
and then perform receive steps of all pending messages. We construct an infinite schedule by
concatenating the schedules σ′0σ
′
1σ2 in the natural way; we refer the reader to [36] for the formal
definitions of concatenating schedules. It is straightforward to verify that σ′0σ
′
1σ2 results in an
admissible execution for the clique network G according to the asynchronous broadcast model.
To conclude our proof, we use an indistinguishability argument. For a given network H, let r
be a vector of |H| bit-strings, representing the respective sequences of random coin flips observed
by the nodes in H. We define α(H, r,N, σ) to be the execution where nodes in H observe the coin
flips given by r, have knowledge of the network size estimate N , and execute steps according to
some schedule σ. Note that α(H, r,N, σ) is an execution prefix if σ is finite. By construction, all
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messages between H0 and H1 are still pending for delivery at the end of schedule σ
′
0σ
′
1. It follows
that, for any vector of random strings r, the execution prefixes α(G, r, 2n, σ′0) and α(H0, r, 2n, σ
′
0)
are indistinguishable for nodes in H0, i.e., they perform the same sequence of local state transitions.
Similarly, α(G, r, 2n, σ′0σ
′
1) and α(H1, r, σ
′
1) are indistinguishable for nodes in H1.
Recall that the lengths of the prefixes σ′0 and σ
′
1 are chosen in a way such that all nodes in H0
(resp. H1) decide in the (finite) schedule σ
′
0 (resp. σ
′
1) with probability ≥ 1−1/n, and by the above
indistinguishability, the same is true by the end of schedule σ′0σ
′
1. Conditioned on the event E that
this is happens, we have argued above that all nodes in H0 decide on 0 with probability at least
1 − ǫ when executing the schedule σ′0σ′1σ2 in the network G. Given the same schedule, nodes in
H1 decide on 1 with probability ≥ 1− ǫ and hence agreement is violated with probability at least
(1 − ǫ)2. Let F be the event that the algorithm fails. Since we have assumed that the algorithm
fails with probability at most ǫ, we get
ǫ ≥ Pr [F ] ≥ Pr [F | E] Pr [E] ≥ (1− ǫ)2
(
1− 1n
)2 ≥ 12 (1− ǫ)2 .
Solving the inequality yields ǫ ≥ 2−√3 as required.
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Algorithm 4 Almost-everywhere agreement in the abstract MAC layer model. Code for node u.
1: val← consensus input value
2: ⊲ Phase 1
3: initialize X ← 0; R← ∅
4: while flip coin() = heads do
5: X ← X + 1
6: bcast(X)
7: while waiting for ack do
8: add received messages to R
9: X ← max(R ∪ {X})
10: N ← 2X
11: ⊲ Phase 2
12: T ← ⌈cN log3(N) log log(N)⌉, where c is a sufficiently large constant.
13: initialize array of sets R[1], . . . , R[T ]← ∅
14: for i← 1, . . . , T do ⊲ Start of round i at u
15: u becomes active with probability 1N
16: if u is active then
17: ρ← unif. at random sampled integer from [1,X4]
18: else
19: ρ←∞
20: bcast(〈i, ρ, val〉)
21: while waiting for ack do
22: add received messages to R[i]
23: for each message m = 〈i′, ρ′, val′〉 ∈ R[i] do
24: if i′ = i and ρ′ < ρ then ⊲ Received message from node with smaller rank
25: val← val′
26: else if i′ > i then ⊲ Received message from node active in future round
27: add m to R[i′]
28: else
29: discard message m
30: decide on val
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